DOCUMENT RESUME

ED 233 466 EA 016 028

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TITLE Some "Yes, Buts" and Educational Administration. A UCEA Occasional Paper.
INSTITUTION University Council for Educational Administration, Columbus, Ohio.
REPORT NO UCEA-OP-8301
PUB DATE 83
NOTE 27p.; Paper presented at a University Council for Educational Administration Conference on Educational Leadership in honor of Jack Culbertson (Austin, TX, May 1982).
AVAILABLE FROM Publications, University Council for Educational Administration, 29 West Woodruff Avenue, Room 066, Columbus, OH 43210 ($3.25).
PUB TYPE Viewpoints (120)

EDRS PRICE MF01/PC02 Plus Postage.
DESCRIPTORS Administrative Principles; *Educational Administration; *Educational Philosophy; Educational Principles; Educational Theories; Elementary Secondary Education; *Models; *Philosophy

ABSTRACT

A discussion of the importance of skeptical probing in educational administration considers fundmental philosophical concerns, issues in inquiry, several theoretical frameworks, sociology of knowledge perspectives, and implications for educational administration programs. Philosophy suggests the best source of knowledge in a field as diverse as educational administration is not "facts" but the interplay of ideas and observations--or inquiry--which encourages multiple perspectives and methods. Phenomenology, for example, with its focus on essences, provides a valuable perspective. Moreover, no attempt to affect ethical outcomes can ignore people's social circumstances. Despite limitations, positivism, emphasizing meaning and exposition, and ethnography, emphasizing observation, are valuable in educational administration. Similarly, a theoretical framework such as public choice theory, which identifies self-interest as the primary motivation of teachers and administrators, is useful but easily criticized when focused too narrowly on schools or confronted with contradictions such as effective educational programs. The sociology of knowledge perspective emphasizes historical, social, and psychological contexts in shaping ideas. This perspective also furnishes such assessment norms as universalism, disinterestedness, and organized skepticism. Practitioners and students of educational administration would be well served by greater awareness of philosophical issues. (PB)

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A UCEA OCCASIONAL PAPER

SOME "YES, BUTS" AND EDUCATIONAL ADMINISTRATION

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#8301

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A UCEA OCCASIONAL PAPER: #8301

SOME "YES, BUTS" AND EDUCATIONAL ADMINISTRATION

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Paper presented at a UCEA Conference on Educational Leadership in honor of Jack Culbertson, University of Texas at Austin, May 1982.

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"Yes, but" affirms and demurs. I am going to do both in exploring several questions of philosophy, theory and research in educational administration, along with some implications for practice and preparation.

First, however, I want to say something about Jack Culbertson whom we so appropriately honor through these proceedings. I first met Jack at UCEA's initial seminar on theory held at the University of Chicago in November 1957. During the summer of 1958 while I was a Kellogg fellow at the University of Oregon I got to know him much better. Still on the Oregon faculty, although he would soon become executive director of UCEA, he was then completing the book with Jacobson and Reller on cases that contains what continues to be the best discussion available in educational administration on that teaching method.[1]

Since those days I have had countless opportunities to work with Jack Culbertson—in seminars and writing projects including a jointly edited book, during six years on the UCEA Board, on various committees and commissions, and in a host of less formal circumstances. He is a tireless worker, a gifted scholar in the classical mode, a capable administrator, but perhaps most of all, a man of vision who can see what ought to be, and guide a process of conceptualization, analysis and debate that usually results in substantial progress. When we consider that he has been engaged over and over in that process during his 22 years with UCEA we can more fully realize what he has been able to accomplish. Indeed, no one has done more overall for educational administration as a University-based field of study and preparation. I have sometimes differed with Jack on issues in educational administration, but I respect him, admire him, and consider it a privilege to work with him and to count him as a friend.

Having made an unqualified endorsement, I return to my theme, "Yes, but." The general point, of course, is that there is virtually nothing in this world or in educational administration that is absolute and final. The quest for certainty, to use the title of one of Dewey's books,[2] ends in dogma, not in truth, and those who dispense cure-alls deserve to be doubted, not followed. To put it another way, there are two or more sides to most questions, and there are always counter argu- ments and different perspectives. There are numerous philosophies, theories, and methods and all of them have their strong points and their weak ones. All are instrumentalities in the sense that they are human inventions designed to enhance our understanding of certain aspects of our common experience. Indeed, the whole enterprise surrounding the construction and examination of ideas is a demanding, creative, very human one that can furnish crucial insights but also can easily go awry. Hence, the importance of a "Yes, but" stance.

My treatment of "Yes, buts" begins with some philosophical concerns. Then, a few issues in inquiry, especially in connection with meaning and exposition, are considered. This is followed by comments on several theoretical frameworks in educational administration including the newly applied public choice approach. After that, some observations on educational administration are made from a sociology of knowledge perspective. Finally, implications are drawn for practice and preparation programs in educational administration.

Some Philosophic Concerns

An affirmation of the importance of philosophy to educational administration is an appropriate starting point. This is not a novel proposition, but one that has been

advanced many times before.[3] Whether philosophy of education is flourishing or in disarray, and advocates can be found for both views,[4] it is clear that philosophy proper has much to offer educational administration, especially in the areas of ethics and values, and epistemology and philosophy of science.

A Simplistic Dichotomy

The demur that accompanies this general affirmation is based on the danger that philosophic arguments advanced in educational administration will not be sufficiently informed philosophically. Indeed, substantial confusion already characterizes some of the current philosophic writing.

An example is found in the simplistic positivism - phenomenology dichotomy. Greenfield, for instance, lumps views he opposes under the positivistic label whether they belong there or not, and his position has been labeled phenomenological even though it has only the faintest relationship to philosophical phenomenology.[5] Hills, perhaps more accurately, used the term naturalistic to refer to what Greenfield called positivistic.[6] Unhappily, the former term has a somewhat different and broader meaning when used to designate a general philosophical position and a very different one when used by advocates of "naturalistic" research.[7] The latter point bares another confusion, namely, that while some individuals apply philosophic labels to broad conceptions, others use them in connection with particular research methods or styles. Hence, it is easy to conjure up an intellectual nightmare in which the uninformed consider themselves positivists because they prefer questionnaire-statistical research or phenomenologists because they prefer field studies, or apply the labels to others for the same reasons.

Such nonsense aside, it is important to keep in mind that there is a wide range of philosophic schools, systematic and some not so systematic thinkers, and the modern trend, which tends to deemphasize schools in favor of the particular positions of particular philosophers on particular issues. Elsewhere, I have advanced a philosophical position based on a naturalistic-instrumentalist viewpoint that is an attractive alternative to positivism and phenomenology.[8] It is one of many possible alternatives, but it is a philosophy that is compatible with a broad spectrum of social science theorizing and research styles.

Various philosophical and theoretical perspectives make different assumptions about man and the world, although they sometimes exhibit surprising similarities, a point illustrated in a recent account blending ethnomethodology with Karl Popper's thought.[9] People often choose sides on the basis of personal predilections, culture and the times, a topic we shall return to later.

Nevertheless, historically some philosophical positions have seemed more defensible or less so as times changed and as various kinds of evidence accumulated. To cite three major examples, the reality of Platonic forms, a rigid Cartesian dualism of mind and matter, and the Marxian conception of historical necessity have all become somewhat anachronistic in recent years. Putting it another way, once in a while a philosophical position is vindicated or vanquished even though the victory or defeat might not be complete or final. However, most of the larger questions continue to be debated despite shifting interest and attention. Hence, philosophical positions on

metaphysics, theory of knowledge, and ethics should be explicit, especially when issues affected by them are considered.

Facts as Straw Men

An issue that has been discussed in the debates on theory in educational administration, but which needs clarification is whether there is a world that is independent of our theories about it, or as Greenfield formulates it, whether facts are independent of theories.[10] From a philosophical perspective, the metaphysical question of an independent world cannot be resolved because the world is apprehended only through minds. However, evidence from fields such as astronomy, geology, and biology strongly implies that there is an independent world, thus strengthening the position of metaphysical realism.

Nevertheless, the plausibility of metaphysical realism is irrelevant to these debates in educational administration; the position is as little a part of positivism in both its logical empiricist and analytical forms as it is of phenomenology. Indeed, in a variety of philosophies, scientific inquiry is treated in terms of theories and observations, not in terms of theories and things. Even facts are commonly defined as statements (not things) about which competent observers can agree.

The crucial issue is not an independent world. It is whether there is any order in the world. The answer to this question is yes, an answer we affirm in a practical way every time we fly, or take medicine or behave in accordance with social norms. Again, metaphysical realism is unnecessary. From the standpoint of inquiry, all that is being affirmed is that theories and observations can lead to predictions that are consistent with new observations. It is clear that theories impose order on observations, but it is equally clear that predicted observations are essential if theories are to be warranted.

The point of all this is that debates about metaphysical reality and "facts" miss the mark. The argument that scientific inquiry is wedded to a single reality and devoted to uncovering the "facts" that constitute that reality is not only false, it is not germane to the issues currently being discussed in educational administration. To attack such a view is to attack a straw man because the view is a naive one not held by many modern philosophers. Today, inquiry is likely to be seen as the interplay of ideas and observations. Ideas guide and explain observations, and observations check ideas. But the ideas change over time providing new vistas or "realities" to be tested. As long as there is some order in the world discerned by using ideas in conjunction with observations, the value of inquiry is affirmed.

In spite of the fact that inquiry is often badly done and has substantial limitations, it is still our best source of knowledge and understanding. Furthermore, its open, tentative and self-correcting character, along with its emphasis on the creation and free expression of ideas and their public verification give expression to values that embrace creativity, freedom and skepticism while rejecting every form of dogmatism.[11] Inquiry, so conceived, encourages the multiple perspectives and methods so useful in a field like educational administration that encompasses both broad interests and a variety of sub-specialties.[12]

Phenomenological Possibilities

The phenomenological method is a good example of one that ought to be tried in educational administration. Indeed, phenomenologically-oriented scholars might make a substantive contribution to educational administration if they took phenomenology seriously. The stale discussions of "positivism" which seem to be their main preoccupation hardly do justice to phenomenology.

As Farber points out, phenomenology's strength lies in its method. While Husserl's later system of transcendental phenomenological idealism is a highly controversial world view with all of the limitations its name implies, phenomenology strictly interpreted as a descriptive philosophy is capable of more general agreement.[13]

The method of phenomenological analysis is based on the suspension of all past judgments. Such judgments are not abandoned or altered, they are held in abeyance, and their referents are "bracketed" or put aside. When everything is bracketed only the pure consciousness or pure experiences of given individuals are left. The objects of phenomenological analysis can be real or fictive, but essences constitute the focus of traditional phenomenological method.[14]

Historically, phenomenological analysis was attempted by sociologists such as Alfred Vierkandt and Max Scheler to probe the essential elements of social relations.[15] Rejecting a historical approach, Vierkandt examined fundamental dispositions such as imitation, self-respect, sympathy and sociability, and collective phenomena like morale and group self-consciousness. Scheler, also known for his popularization of the sociology of knowledge, emphasized cultural sociology, a sociology of the ideal deriving from goals and aspirations. His phenomenological analysis of the nature of sympathy and his exploration of fundamental cultural axioms were major features of this work.

Analyses of this sort could be done in educational administration. They might be concerned with the essential nature of educational organizations or administration, or with topics like administrator effectiveness, leadership, freedom and control in organizations, or loose coupling. I do not know how valuable such analyses might be, but they appear to have real potential if undertaken by persons who have carefully studied phenomenological method and its various historical manifestations.

It is unfortunate that we have had so much discussion of phenomenology in educational administration without any attention to the constructive possibilities inherent in that philosophic approach. This suggests dilettantism on the part of certain writers, although educational administration is not alone in this regard. The same charge can be made in other social science and applied fields. It should be clear that, in the present case, I am saying yes, we should be open, if properly skeptical, towards all kinds of perspectives and methods, but we should expect advocates to be thoroughgoing and venturesome, not superficial and timid.

Ought and Is

Another area of philosophical concern is values. Obviously, values play a central part in administration as they do in life generally. This is well recognized in our field,

but in spite of seminars and publications on the topic, values have not been the focus of major intellectual attention.[16]

There are several reasons for this. One is that scholars in educational administration have been interested primarily in empirical endeavors, that is, in examining the is. Another, though far less important, is a certain reluctance to impose one's values on others, a consideration that applies to both professors and educational administrators. For instance, the question of how far public school administrators or those who prepare them should go in attempting to impose their conceptions of the good school is an open one.

Still, I do not believe that attention to the distinction between the ought and the is, emphasized in educational administration by Halpin, Griffiths, and others,[17] was misplaced. This distinction is essentially linguistic. It simply enjoins us to recognize that asserting that something is the case is quite different from asserting that that same something ought to be the case. Appreciation of this difference is especially important in value laden areas like educational administration.

However, recognizing this linguistic distinction is not the same as saying that science is value free or that the ought and the is are separate in administrative practice. In fact, it is quite clear that values affect science in a variety of ways which is why the norms of inquiry include prescriptions to reduce or explicate the influence of values and predispositions that might bias research. It is also clear that administrative life and the decisions made therein require an intermixture of the normative and the descriptive.

This conjunction of the ought and is in administrative practice brings me to my main point, an affirmation of the overriding significance of values, but a demur concerning viewpoints that separate the ought and the is in treating ethical and value questions in educational administration. Indeed, any effort to reemphasize values in educational administration that fails to stress the utility of the is for value judgments will be in serious error.

From the standpoint of administration, the main problem in regard to the achievement of desirable aims in education is not the values of administrators. I believe most of them are committed to improving the lives of the students and staff members in their organizations. Educational administrators are normally persons of good will and ethical bent. The basic problem is the successful implementation of desirable outcomes and the avoidance of undesirable ones.

Most school organizations and their environments are highly complex settings peopled by a variety of individuals and groups. The administrator who wishes to move the organization in a particular direction or who must choose between competing goods or the lesser of evils needs more than good will. He or she needs an array of concepts and theories that portray human behavior in social, political, organizational, psychological and economic terms, and that have the potential both to enhance and help explain what the administrator sees. This kind of understanding should be joined with the kind of vision furnished by conceptions of the desirable or of what is good and right, if ethical outcomes are to be effected by the administrator. In other words, in modern administration good intentions do not suffice, but need to be buttressed by a what Schwab called "a sophisticated and cynical grasp"[18] of theories.

There is no doubt that decision-making that attends to values in this way is complex and difficult. Moreover, it requires what Dewey calls deliberation,[19] a conscious thinking through of possible courses of action and their consequences, a process that can be neglected by administrators preoccupied with the more immediate demands of their jobs. But, in spite of complexities and difficulties, values should be a vital part of administration. Because moral choices occur in social and human contexts, if values are to be intelligently recognized and implemented in educational administration, they cannot be divorced from our empirical knowledge of man and his social circumstances.

Some Issues in Inquiry

Meaning and Exposition

Meaning and exposition are problems of both philosophy and science. They are among the central concerns of logical empiricism and analytic philosophy. Even though phenomenology differs from positivism in funda- mental ways, the product of phenomenological method in practice may be surprisingly like what analytic philosophers do when they examine an idea.

In science, the focus is on the meaning of concepts including their operational definitions, and on theoretical exposition or the logical structure of theoretical explanation and argument. Philosophy of science, where matters such as these have been explored, has been a major interest of positivist philosophers.

I have criticized positivism as a narrow philosophy. With regard to philosophy of science, its lopsided emphasis on verification does injustice to the creative side of inquiry.[20] Moreover, the commitment to precision of meaning in positivism can lead to the cavalier dismissal of some important ideas as meaningless.

Still, the emphasis on meaning that lies at the core of this philosophy, particularly in relation to inquiry, remains a crucial concern. Indeed, current inquiries in educational administration (as in other social science and applied fields) need to be as careful as ever about the extent to which their concepts and theories are characterized by explicit definition and exposition. The fact that "qualitative" methods, which have been around for so long, have recently gained converts and popularity, underscores that need.

The main point is a simple one. Regardless of how inquiry is styled, hermeneutic, holistic, ethnomethodological or whatever, operational definitions of some kind will be employed for the concepts used, whether explicit or not, and there will be some sort of structure to the interpretive or explanatory argument made, whether explicit or not. Obviously, the way to avoid hidden operationism and ambiguous argument is to be explicit about definitions and exposition.

This is not in any way to deny the tremendous importance in inquiry of hunches, partially formed ideas, wild guesses or sudden insights. Science is well served by what Feyerabend calls an "anything goes" principle.[21] However, communication in inquiry requires that eventually everyone knows just what it was that went and how it did so.

I do not expect theorists and researchers in educational administration to be logicians. Formal logical exposition has never been popular in the social sciences where simple prose argument has dominated theoretical expression from the beginning.[22] Personally, I don't object to studies that have flaws (most do) if they are interesting otherwise, but we should be told explicitly what was done and be given the reasoning that went into the explanation of what was observed.

To summarize, I am saying yes, positivism is an inadequate philosophy, but it has some key strengths including its emphasis on meaning. This emphasis provides the theorist-researcher with two crucial questions. The first is "What operations did you actually carry out in your research to define the concepts you employed?" The second is "What is the logical structure of the explanation for what was observed?" We cannot afford to ignore either of these questions.

Ethnography

The answers to these questions can be complicated in qualitative inquiries where they have sometimes been neglected. One kind of qualitative research which has become popular rather suddenly in education is ethnography.

As we all know, ethnography is cultural anthropology's version of observational, field research. Sociological participant and non-participant observation, and case studies in psychology and other fields are similar but not the same. The best known ethnography in educational administration is probably Wolcott's treatment of an elementary principal,[23] but observational studies have a long history in educational administration beginning with Boyan's examination of a junior high school reported in 1954.[24]

I have argued that the sociological approach to observation is especially appropriate in educational administration because it is theory oriented and has traditionally dealt with systems such as organizations.[25] However, this reflects my personal preferences. There are clearly many similarities between the sociological and anthropological approaches, and there is no question that ethnography can make major contributions to educational administration.

Still, while affirming the value of ethnographic research, a few "buts" can help to provide a balanced view. Representativeness and generalization are usually cited as problems in qualitative research, and they are significant problems in such research as they are in all inquiries. However, here I want to focus on more mundane problems that are more specific to ethnography.

Ethnography had its roots in the study of cultures, often primitive and relatively isolated, that were foreign to the observer. It flourished in Great Britain which had an extensive colonial empire and in America which had an array of Indian and Eskimo cultures. An obvious question is whether there are transfer problems as methods tailored for such settings are applied to the study of organizations and other collectivities in the observer's home culture.

One danger is that the holistic emphasis so appropriate in cultures lacking substantial internal differentiation might mislead investigators examining more complex, more differentiated units. The loose coupling concept,[26] for instance,

suggests that possibility. This danger is worth keeping in mind although the nominalistic element in American anthropology stemming from Franz Boas is a countervailing force.

As a more general point, while holistic thinking stresses interconnection and context, questions remain on the kinds and scope of the wholes depicted. With regard to kind, for example, a Marxist ethnographer studying an organization would likely emphasize the economic and political features of its environment while a non-Marxist might emphasize other features. With regard to scope, the line has to be drawn someplace. Is a holistic treatment whole enough if it deals with the context provided by a small group, or must it include the organization, the community, the society, and international concerns as well?

The empathy-detached observation issue is another area of concern. Its resolution hinges on meaning. In order to observe effectively one must understand the meaning of what is observed. This requires an empathetic understanding of the nuances of cultural expression. That is the essence of Geertz's thick description.[27]

In this context the point made earlier about the importance of explicit operational definitions has to do with how meaning is attributed by observers, in a sense, the meaning of meaning. Using Ryle's example cited by Geertz, to describe someone winking an eye is thin description, but to describe someone parodying a wink to deceive an innocent into thinking a conspiracy is underway is thick description. Geertz thinks of the simplistic thin description as operationalism. I contend that the crucial issue of operationalism here is the specific observations and definitions that enable the observer to see the wink as parody. Parody is the essential concept used to give meaning to the observation, and operationalism enjoins the observer to indicate what was seen to evoke the parody label.

When one explores context, subtle gradations of meaning, myths, symbols, and the like, often central to ethnographic accounts (and sociological ones), one still has an obligation to provide information on the grounds for one's descriptive-conceptual operations. After all, there are many pitfalls to be avoided. For instance, most of us have an eye for the striking illustration in field work. How likely is it that interpretive accounts built around such incidents could be both interesting and misleading?

Ethnography, like administration and teaching, has a weak technology but requires broad sensitivity and considerable wisdom. Hence, all sorts of people label their work enthnographic which causes ethnographers concern about the maintenance of their own and the method's legitimacy.[28]

The ethnographic culture itself is hardly homogeneous. There are a number of different approaches and schools of thought[29] in cultural anthropology which result in the usual disputes.[30] Moreover, there are quite narrow versions of ethnography such as the kind of micro-ethnography used in classroom research,[31] and the use of quantitative methods in ethnographic work is no longer a rarity.[32]

The faddish adoption of ethnography in some areas of education gives pause, especially since field research in educational administration can be done as well or better in a sociological mode. Nevertheless, competently conducted studies that are

specifically ethnographic can be valuable in educational administration. Realistic awareness of the method's limitations simply puts things on firmer grounds.

Theories With Achilles' Heels

This last point, of course, applies to all methods whether observational, interview, questionnaire, or whatever, and to techniques like Mintzberg's structured observation, sociometry and its partial offspring network analysis, or input-output regimens. It applies to our theories, too. All have their peculiar strong and weak sides beyond those inherent in the limitations of science itself.

Bear in mind, as a few theoretical frameworks are briefly considered, that each contributes a heuristic explanatory slant to our understanding of educational administration. Still, theories are often presented as antedotes to errors of the past if not quite as panaceas, so it is worthwhile to expose their Achilles' heels, the "buts" that arise in the case of each of the perspectives.

Many of these "buts" are familiar or obvious. Social system theories neglect variations within types as when "the school as a social system" is examined. Some systems thinkers invoke abstractions like imperative needs, than bail out with functional equivalents, a valuable concept, but one that can cause empirical vexations. In spite of everything that has been written on situational factors, leadership theories continue to deemphasize context, especially the influence of an organization's close and more distant environments on change.[33] Contingency theory isn't a theory at all, but an umbrella term. It is used for the general point of view that special circumstances or contingencies affect relationships, and it is invoked in inquiries that explicate contingencies, even though these studies actually are guided by a variety of different theories.[34]

A conceptual framework that has received increasing attention in educational administration is public choice theory. This perspective assumes, in Michaelsen's words, that "economic agents . . . act largely, if not solely, to advance their own welfare within whatever institutional arrangements they find themselves."[35] Like absentee firms with hired managers, public schools are seen as essentially dominated by their de facto owners, the school administrators and teachers who maintain their domination through their superior knowledge of organizational processes and activities, and their ability to keep sensitive internal matters secret. Since political control of public schools is weak, it is held that the administrators and teachers operate the schools to serve their own interests instead of those of their clients or the public.[36] Self-interest as the basis of behavior is a key feature of this political-economic perspective.

However, the proposition that human behavior is dictated by narrow self-interests is easily criticized. One issue is falsifiability. Self-interest can be defined, in the manner of the old instinct psychology, so as to make the proposition non-falsifiable. All uncompelled behavior is cast in terms of self-interest, even behavior that seems otherwise on its face. For instance, it could be argued that Sidney Carton, the hero of Dickens' Tale of Two Cities went to the guillotine in place of Charles Darnay because he chose to do so, ultimately serving his own interest in a larger good than life.

Such an expanded notion of self-interest not only makes disproof impossible, it leaves the concept of self-interest bereft of scientific value and renders meaningless the concept of selflessness. These matters of definition and argument aside, the idea that narrow self-interest determines behavior disregards the impact of social norms and collective expectations on individuals, the place of habit in our lives, and the part that altruism plays in human affairs.

The self-interest concept seems particularly limited when applied to behavior in schools. These organizations are focal points for community expectations and aspirations. This and their stewardship over children and youth, along with the moral dimension that entails, make for a setting that can evoke commitment to the welfare of others and a spirit of selflessness. Indeed, given the high demands and low returns of the work, even the stereotypic dedicated teacher continues to have some basis in fact, despite teachers' unions and collective bargaining.

Public choice theorists should be wary of assuming that professional educators are a homogeneous collectivity. Although the emphasis on self-interest should preclude such an assumption, when it is made it bolsters the public choice portrayal of an insular school bureaucracy united in service to its own interests. A fragmented bureaucracy complicates the public choice argument.

Actually, contrary to public choice theory, it appears that school personnel are quite sensitive to community standards and demands. Caution with regard to controversial issues, and efforts to avoid offending vocal or influential segments of the community and even to anticipate community reactions are hallmarks of this sensitivity.[37] Such behavior can be explained as adaptive responses to political vulnerability, but public choice theory overlooks such vulnerability, instead portraying school administrators and teachers as wielding wide discretionary powers unhampered by concerns for the public.

Still another difficulty with public choice theory lies in the Hobbesian world it presents. In such a world, educators would appear to be no more or less culpable than any others interested in the schools, whether members of taxpayers' associations, PTA's, citizens for education, the moral majority, students and their parents, or advocates of non-public education. All represent narrow interests that serve the public good badly or well, depending on how it is defined. In concentrating primarily on public bureaucracies and their employees, public choice theory deflects attention from other groups that, according to the theory, will serve narrow constituencies often to the detriment of the more general good.

In addition, public choice theory fails to account adequately for rationality exemplified when administrators and teachers serve the public well by developing organizational structures and processes that result in effective learning by students. In such situations, it seems likely that the schools will attain reduced political vulnerability, enhanced legitimacy and strengthened organizational prestige, and their personnel will win increased public respect. In these cases, the interests of the educators and the students and their parents coincide, a circumstance normally not foreseen in public choice theory.

Michaelsen has argued that public choice theory and the institutionalized organizations perspective of Meyer and Rowan lead to different predictions about student outcomes in goal focused and goal displaced school districts. Public choice

theory predicts greater student achievement in relation to costs in the focused districts than in the displaced ones, but the institutionalized organizations view makes no prediction about differential outcomes because even in goal focused districts internal loose coupling deflects potential student gains. Michaelsen proposed empirical tests to see which theory was wrong.[38]

Such tests would be desirable, but a rejection of the position attributed to Meyer and Rowan could not be interpreted as unique support for public choice theory. Michaelson has hit upon a peculiar weakness in Meyer and Rowan's formulation. Their depiction of school organizations as reflections of a relatively homogeneous society pervasively oriented to symbolic and ceremonial features of schooling apparently leaves little basis for the prediction of differential student effects.[39] However, most theories that deal with school organizations would predict different student results in goal focused and displaced districts, including theories that stress the social context of education.[40] For this reason, and because the institutionalized organizations approach has been pushed to its logical extreme and an implausible prediction, public choice theory has little to gain from its proposed contest with Meyer and Rowan.

Political theory has a broader focus than public choice theory which is a perspective in political economy. The political process clearly affects the public schools, and its study is one aspect of policy analysis and implementation which has been suggested as an integrative framework for educational administration.[41]

Of course, political theory is a generic term like sociological theory. Its use conveys little beyond alerting us to the probability of attention to concepts like power, influence, conflict, bargaining and governance. However, students of politics are divided into a number of camps including those that feature historical, normative, critical, and behavioral orientations. Within these broad orientations which sometime overlap (especially the first two), are found more specific theoretical approaches. Hence, this field is as fragmented as any.

Some observations are made later on the political approach to educational administration. Here, let it be noted that some political perspectives may transfer awkwardly to educational administration, and even deflect attention from interesting problems. For instance, the battle cry of students of politics proclaiming the political character of educational administration was partly a response to the normative declarations of some practicing school executives. Yet, everybody already understood that educational administration was political, and the oft repeated battle cry became trite. The intriguing question was why so many administrators found it useful to assert that education should be above politics.

It seems likely that such a stance evokes broad, general goals stemming from the values undergirding public education in this country. The symbolic significance of these goals, which are also in a real sense the official goals of American public schools, is overlooked by those political theorists who direct their attention exclusively to the actual goals of coalitions and influentials. It may be that school organizations are more like church organizations, or perhaps like hospital organizations than they are like governmental bureaus or municipal agencies. Perhaps the rhetoric of compromise sets a trap for the educational administrator. The articulation of purpose, not the rhetoric of compromise, might be an effective administrative response in many circumstances.

One might have expected that the politics of education would plumb the kinds of problems these considerations suggest. But rather than exploring the special problems of educational administration,[41] it has been concerned with the utility for educational administration of concepts that work in other areas of public administration and government. Perhaps because political science is essentially an applied field, its applications to educational institutions ordinarily first were applications to political ones.

These brief comments on theoretical approaches have been made in the role of a devil's advocate, a part that needs to be played more often in educational administration. Next, a few points are made from a sociology of knowledge perspective.

Sociology of Knowledge

Yes, theories come and go, but more is involved than their scientific efficacy, especially in the social sciences where definitive agreement about a theory's disproof often is difficult to obtain. Indeed, in these fields, fads and fashions sometimes seem to dictate the popularity of particular theories and methods.[43]

Contexts

From a sociology of knowledge perspective, historical, social, and psychological contexts shape both the development and reception of ideas. Within this perspective are found different emphases. Marxists, for instance, press the overriding importance of economic and class influences, while reference group theorists point to the inadequacies of the Marxian conception of social class.[44] Others stress psychological or biographical factors.

A few years ago, I argued that theories would be popular when they fitted underlying ideological positions about the nature of man and the world that were characteristic of the times.[45] Looking at the current American scene,[46] public choice theory and certain political theories could well become the hula hoops of tomorrow. Well organized special interest groups spend large sums in the political arena and are ready to demonstrate and sue at the drop of a leaflet. A highly conservative national administration that has departed in many ways from the moderate course of recent years, by its rhetoric encourages extremists on the right, and by its actions rebuffs the less advantaged members of the society, widening the gap of disaffection between the unfortunate and the rest. Public education has suffered an erosian of both financial and moral support under the current administration, while private and parochial schooling has been extolled. Factions and alliances form, and all of this occurs against a background of declining enrollments, and general economic instability. Public choice theory and political theories that stress the competition for power seem made for such circumstances.

In a broader vein, it could be argued that consensus theories thrive in stable times and situations, while conflict theories thrive in turbulent ones. In a narrower vein, the impact of individual peculiarities should be noted. For example, a prolific writer on educational administration acknowledged in a recent conversation that he might have emphasized certain concepts in his latest treatments of public schools because he was annoyed by changes that required his children to go to a school some

distance from home instead of the nearby one they had expected to attend. For myself, I am aware that the fact that I studied Dewey's philosophy[47] and wrote an M.A. thesis on his conception of social values many years ago, influenced my present views on philosophy, and science. Even though I was critical of certain features of instrumentalism and still have some reservations, I take an instrumentalist-naturalistic position on most philosophical issues. I also feel comfortable with the viewpoint because I like its emphasis on inquiry, human freedom, reflective methods, the reconstruction of experience, and growth, along with its rejection of absolutes and dogmatic creeds.[48]

These examples respectively illustrate the influence on ideas of a memorable incident, of schooling, and of personal predilections. They are noteworthy from the standpoint of an individually-psychologically oriented sociology of knowledge. Schooling is worth underscoring because people trained in particular disciplines who have invested time in certain theories or methods may stress advantages and play down shortcomings. For instance, economists might tout input-output analysis or even public choice theory as peerless boons to educational administration. They could be right, but it is useful to keep in mind that the academic world is a world of specialization, and one danger of specialization is, to use Thorstein Veblen's term, trained incapacity.[49]

In any case, the impact of contexts on ideas seems clear. The influence of ideas on contexts is a more complex matter, not examined here. Considered next is the issue of verification.

Verification

A sociology of knowledge perspective can furnish vital insights, but it need not lead to a relativistic view of verification in inquiry. Ideas can be publically assessed independently of their origins, and scientific norms impose conditions that promote just such assessment.

Parsons,[50] and a number of others have written on scientific norms, but the premier treatment of the topic is still Merton's.[51] Merton examined four major norms in science: universalism or impersonal criteria as tests of truth, communism or the common ownership of results, disinterestedness, and organized skepticism.

Obviously, these norms are sometimes violated in favor of personal or political considerations. Merton catalogues a number of instances from the squabble between Newton and Leibniz over the invention of calculus that was published in Philosophical Transactions of the Royal Society for January and February of 1715 to the machinations of modern scientists presented in James Watson's, The Double Helix.[52] Concerns about priority (if, for most, not eponymy) are often paramount, politiking is rife, famous collaborators get more credit than less known ones (the Matthew effect), and relevant work by others is ignored as the "not invented here" syndrome operates.[53]

The point is a simple one. Theorists and researchers are human; like all of us, sometimes all too human. That their behavior can fall short of standards only underscores the importance of norms that foster good science. This point has been

ignored by those in educational administration who have made so much of theory as ideology.

Notice that all four of Merton's norms concern the verificational side of science. They essentially guard claims to knowledge. Only if applied prematurely or inappropriately would they inhibit the creative side of science, a situation that should be, and usually is, avoided. Indeed, Merton may have missed a norm enjoining openness to creative hypotheses and new ideas, or putting it another way, enjoining tentativeness about present theories and openness to their replacement by better ones.[54] In any event, there is no meaningful verification unless there are interesting ideas to test.

I have tried to show the utility of a sociology of knowledge perspective for educational administration, both in terms of its illumination of how ideas come to the fore,[55] and as an added critical dimension in shaping future directions. But it has also been argued that the verification of ideas is fundamentally unrelated to their contextual origins, and their social and personal consequences.

Preparation and Practice

The array of "Yes, buts" that has been presented is not without implications for preparation and practice in educational administration. Broadly, the whole "Yes, but" stance represents the kind of skeptical probing that should imbue programs in educational administration, and can be useful to the practitioner, especially in assessment and decision-making and in counteracting feelings of omniscience that sometimes accompany administrative office. Blend this kind of skepticism with the search for ideas and a concern with explanation and understanding, and the result is the reflective methods of instrumentalist philosophy.

I have argued elsewhere that such a philosophy provides one basis for preparation programs,[56] although when I gave examples of preparation along these lines,[57] Farquhar's reaction was that such preparation merely represented one professor's personal interests.[58] However, I contend that the philosophical bases of preparation should be made explicit and that this particular philosophy is an especially appropriate one. Its emphasis on inquiry—on curiosity, hypothesis making and experimentation— as both a set of scientific processes and a personal style can help make administration a zestful pursuit.[59] Whitehead's assertion that a University's justification lies in its preservation of the connection between knowledge and the zest of life makes good sense for preparation in educational administration.[60]

The view of inquiry advocated here is anything but scientistic and stiff. It puts aside the belief considered earlier that the aim of inquiry is some kind of hard rock, final reality, as well as simplistic notions of conjunction as cause of the sort long ago demolished by David Hume. Not wedded to any theory or method, it welcomes all of them, but with a skeptical eye that looks to the insights they can provide and their Achilles' heels.

The questions of exposition and operationism raised earlier are among the simplest that can be asked in science and they should be asked frequently because criticism guards intellectual integrity. After all, educational administration often borrows from other fields,[61] as do other areas of administration. Indeed, one writer

describes "the disciplinary field of administration" as "promiscuously receptive" to influences from many different areas of knowledge.[62] However, I do not object to borrowing, only to uncritical borrowing. In fact, other fields have much to offer educational administration, but scholars who borrow these wares should do so critically and with clear purposes. It would be an especial mistake to attempt to take one theory or even one discipline as the basis for educational administration. Although the sociology of knowledge teaches that the exigencies of the times can spawn orthodoxies, that is the last thing we need in educational administration. Both students and practitioners should be selective and critical users of a variety of concepts and theories, not slaves to one.[63]

A conceptual array is a first step towards wisdom in administration because, as I argued earlier, the effective implementation of values in complex educational organizations requires the negotiation of an intricate existential maze.[64] In that task, the same processes that characterize inquiry are essential, the conceptual searching out of alternatives and consequences, in this case, in the pursuit of desirable outcomes.

I recognize that some will discount Deweyan deliberation because of the garbage can character of many administrative decisions[65] and the fast-paced, kaleidoscopic nature of administrator work,[66] and that others will point to human and organizational irrationality as formidable barriers. One can only respond to these objections by affirming them. Dewey fully recognized the limitations of deliberation, and also saw that it could become a vice if practiced abstractly.[67] That is why he stressed the internalization of deliberative methods in the form of habit. But in the end, deliberation has to be deliberate. An administrator who desires to examine competing values and maximize good by employing knowledge about human behavior will have to do so consciously. This means allocating time and sifting through the garbage can. Although things often will go wrong, intentional action can make a difference even in cases where it might not be expected on the basis of past studies. After all, the studies are ordinarily of organizational settings where such intentionality is not a major factor.

Few, if any, modern thinkers doubt that irrationality plays a large part in individual and collective affairs. However, the meaning of rationality presents a difficulty since it is used differently in philosophy and organization theory.[68] Philosophers and others use the term rationality (as distinct from rationalism) to refer to reason and lucidity. Organization theorists use the term to refer to highly bureaucratized settings where, as it were, everything has a place and is in place, and people behave according to formalized requirements. Of course, such settings are merely hypothetical, ideal types. Besides, who would want to work there? Perfect rationality in the first sense is also hypothetical, but it can be sought after and approximated, and unlike an over bureaucratized setting, it is desirable. Reflection and deliberation are other ways of naming that kind of rationality, and bringing it to bear on educational organizations and their administration is at the very heart of preparation and practice in educational administration.

Rationality in the philosophical sense is as relevant as ever to administration. Indeed, even Lindblom's recent pronouncement on muddling through, "Still Muddling, Not Yet Through," can be read as an effort to enhance such rationality in the face of the many barriers to its attainment.[69] On a related front, Boyd and Wheaton found that rational planning was pursued assiduously in most of the high resource school

districts they studied.[70] They commented that the business of labeling schools as anarchic and loosely coupled has nearly become a growth industry, obscuring the fact that some school districts approach the ideal of rational policy-making.

An additional point worth keeping in mind is that organizational rationality in the sense of a congruence of activities and purposes is an effective and an honest organizational defense. Yet, a quite different emphasis can sometimes be found in the politics approach to educational administration. For instance, Burlingame, in an intersting and original paper, twice stated that he seriously doubts that honesty is the best policy for school superintendents who wish to retain power.[71] Of course, it would be difficult to justify absolute honesty on moral grounds because of conflicts with other values like compassion. Also, it is unclear how far Burlingame intends to go in his statement about honesty. However, at the very least, he raises an issue that demands attention from an ethical point of view. Administrative deception and manipulation have little to recommend them from either moral or empirical perspectives. These stratagems would ordinarily be hard to justify and normally are not successful because of the high sensitivity and alertness of others to the actions of executives. In this connection, Scott, Mitchell and Peery contend that the emphasis on gamesmanship in research on organizational politics establishes a "regime-maintenance paradigm" that reinforces such behavior among administrators and neglects moral judgments, even though such judgments have been central to political philosophy for centuries.[72]

These considerations, in the form of additional demurs, underscore the utility of a philosophical basis for preparation and practice in educational administration. Furthermore, the individual student of administration and the practitioner would also be bolstered by philosophic awareness. For such individuals, the old Socratic dictum still holds.[73] Self knowledge, what George Herbert Mead called reflexiveness, can provide a beginning for the reconstruction of experience. Sensitivity to the influence of contexts on ideas can also play a part both in terms of self awareness and in terms of understanding how the role of the educational administrator or professor of administration brings its own special forms of tunnel vision and trained incapacity.

Concluding Comment

My final "Yes, but" is this. Yes, it is important to cultivate skepticism towards all manner of things, but be careful with "Yes, buts." They can be applied too indiscriminately and too quickly. Some ideas need time and gentle tending to develop, and instant criticism can have a chilling effect. Besides, criticism is nowhere near as difficult as building something elegant and constructive, whether in the realm of ideas, or practice, or anywhere.

Notes

1. Jack A. Culbertson, Paul B. Jacobson and Theodore L. Reller, Administrative Relationships (Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice-Hall, 1960).

2. John Dewey, The Quest for Certainty (New York: Minton, Balch, 1929).

3. For example, see Educational Administration: Philosophy in Action, ed. R. E. Ohm and W. G. Monahan (Norman, OK: College of Education, University of Oklahoma, 1965); and my "The Professorship in Educational Administration: A Rationale" in The Professorship in Educational Administration, ed. D. J. Willower and J. A. Culbertson (Columbus, OH and University Park, PA: University Council for Educational Administration and The Pennsylvania State University, 1964), and "Schools, Values and Educational Inquiry," Educational Administration Quarterly 9 (Spring 1973).

4. See the differing views set forth by Paul H. Hirst, Michael W. Apple, Allen Graubard and C. A. Bowers in "Symposium on Philosophy and Education," Harvard Educational Review 51 (August 1981).

5. See Thomas B. Greenfield, "The Man Who Comes Back Through the Door in the Wall," Educational Administration Quarterly 16 (Fall 1980), and his other work cited there in.

6. Jean Hills, "A Perspective on Perspectives," UCEA Review 19 (October 1977).

7. On "naturalistic" studies see Egon G. Guba and Yvonna S. Lincoln, Effective Evaluation (San Francisco: Jossey-Bass, 1981).

8. "Educational Administration: Some Philosophical and Other Considerations," Journal of Educational Administration 19 (Summer 1981).

9. Nicholas Tilley, "Popper, Positivism and Ethnomethodology," British Journal of Sociology 31 (March 1980).

10. Greenfield, "The Man Who," pp. 28-29.

11. Writers like Paul Feyerabend fail to distinguish between this free spirit of inquiry and dogmatism worked in the name of science. See his Against Method (London: NLB, 1975).

12. A multiplicity of theories and methods has characterized and been welcomed in educational administration where the idea of a "grand" theory has been largely a straw man. See my "Some Issues in Research on School Organizations," in Problem Finding in Educational Administration, ed. Glenn L. Immegart and William Lowe Boyd (Lexington, MA: D. C. Heath, 1979). 13. Marvin Farber, The Foundation of Phenomenology (Cambridge, MA: Harvard

University Press, 1943).

14. See Farber, The Foundation of Phenomenology, and also his "Experience and Subjectivism," in Philosophy for the Future, ed. R. W. Sellars, V. J. McGill and M. Farber (New York: Macmillan, 1949), and "Modes of Reflection" Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 8 (June 1948).

15. These thinkers are examined and their main works are cited in Don Martindale, The Nature and Types of Sociological Theory (Boston: Houghton-Mifflin, 1960). Note, however, that Farber, among others, questioned whether Scheler used genuinely phenomenological methods. See M. Farber, "The Phenomenological Tendency," Journal of Philosophy 59 (August 1962).

16. UCEA seminars on values in administration were organized in 1960 at Ohio State University and in 1979 at the University of Alberta. Some examples of work dealing with values include Robin H. Farquhar, The Humanities in Preparing Educational Administrators (Eugene, OR: ERIC Clearinghouse on Educational Management, University of Oregon, 1970); E. Miklos, "Ethical Aspects of Administrative Action: Implications for Research and Preparation," Administrator's Notebook 26 (January 1978); Thomas J. Sergiovanni, "A Social Humanities View of Educational Policy and Administration," Educational Administration Quarterly 16 (Winter 1980); and D. J. Willower, "Values and Educational Administration," Peabody Journal of Education 39 (November 1961).

17. Daniel E. Griffiths, Administrative Theory (New York: Appleton-Century-Crofts, 1959); and Andrew W. Halpin, "The Development of Theory in Educational Administration," in Administrative Theory in Education, ed. A. W. Halpin (Chicago: Midwest Administration Center, University of Chicago, 1958).

18. Joseph J. Schwab, "The Professorship in Educational Administration: Theory-Art-Practice," in Willower and Culbertson, The Professorship, p. 47.

19. See Human Nature and Conduct (New York: Modern Library, 1939), pp. 189-209 for John Dewey's treatment of deliberation.

20. "Ideology and Science in Organization Theory," Educational Administration Quarterly 15 (Fall 1979).

21. Feyerabend, Against Method.

22. A classic exception, of course, is Clark L. Hull. See, for example, his A Mathematico - Deductive Theory of Rote Learning (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1940). Durkheim's theory of suicide has also been presented in simple syllogistic form. See George C. Homans, "Contemporary Theory in Sociology," in Handbook of Modern Sociology, ed. R. E. L. Faris (Chicago: Rand McNally, 1964). A few years ago I developed the theoretical rationale for one aspect of the work on pupil control in school organizations in syllogistic form. An unusual feature of this effort was that all three propositions of the syllogism, its major premise, its minor premise, and its conclusion were subjected to empirical test. See Donald J. Willower and James D. Lawrence, "Teachers' Perceptions of Student Threat to Teacher Status and Teacher Pupil Control Ideology," Psychology in the Schools 16 (October 1979).

23. Harry F. Wolcott, The Man in the Principal's Office (New York: Holt, Rinehart and Winston, 1973).

24. Norman J. Boyan, "A Study of Formal and Informal Organization of a School Faculty," (Unpublished doctoral dissertation, Harvard University, 1951).

25. "Some Issues in Research on School Organizations."

26. Karl E. Weick, "Educational Organizations as Loosely Coupled Systems," Administrative Science Quarterly 21 (March 1976).

27. Clifford Geertz borrowed this term from Gilbert Ryle. See the former's, The Interpretation of Culture (New York: Basic Books, 1973).

28. See, for example, David M. Fellerman, "Ethnography in Educational Research: The Dynamics of Diffusion," Educational Researcher 11 (March 1982); Ray C. Rist, "Blitzkrieg Ethnography: On the Trans- formation of a Method into a Movement," Educational Researcher 9 (February 1980); and Harry Wolcott, "Criteria for an Ethnographic Approach to Research in Schools," Human Organization 34 (Summer 1975). Long term observation in another culture, once a major source of legitimation, seems to have become less crucial, adding to the problem.

29. For an excellent, brief treatment see Peggy Reeves Sanday, "The Ethnographic Paradigm(s)" Administrative Science Quarterly 24 (December 1979).

30. For instance, that between Clifford Geertz and Ward Goodenough noted in Sanday, "The Ethnographic Paradigm(s)."

31. Hugh Mehan, "Structuring School Structure," Harvard Educational Review 48 (February 1978).

32. For example, see part III of Ethnography and Language in Educational Settings, ed. Judith Green and Cynthia Wallat (Norwood, NJ: Ablex, 1981).

33. For a study that stresses these environments see Louis M. Smith, John J. Prunty and David C. Dwyer, "A Longitudinal Nested Systems Model of Innovation and Change in Schooling," in Organizational Behavior in Schools and School Districts, ed. Samuel B. Bacharach (New York: Praeger, 1981).

34. See my "Contemporary Issues in Theory in Educational Administration," Educational Administration Quarterly 16 (Fall 1980); and Claudia Bird Schoonhoven, "Problems in Contingency Theory: Testing Assumptions Hidden Within the Language of Contingency Theory," Administrative Science Quarterly 26 (September 1981).

35. Jacob B. Michaelsen, "The Political Economy of School District Administration," Educational Administration Quarterly 17 (Summer 1981), p. 99. See also his "A Theory of Decision-Making in the Public Schools: A Public Choice Approach," in Bacharach, Organizational Behavior.

36. Michaelsen, "The Political Economy."

37. See my "School Organizations: Perspectives in Juxtaposition," Educational Administration Quarterly 18 (Summer 1982).

38. Michaelsen, "The Political Economy."

39. See John W. Meyer and Brian Rowan, "Institutionalized Organizations: Formal Structure as Myth and Ceremony," American Journal of Sociology 83 (September 1977), and "The Structure of Educational Organizations," in Marshall W. Meyer and associates, Environments and Organizations (San Francisco: Jossey-Bass, 1978).

40. Willower, "Perspectives in Juxtaposition."

41. William Lowe Boyd, "Policy Analysis in Educational Administration: Its Promise and Challenge," (Paper presented at the Annual Meeting of the American Educational Research Association, Los Angeles, April 1981); and Boyd and Glenn L. Immegart, "Education's Turbulent Environment and Problem Finding" in Immegart and Boyd, Problem Finding in Educational Administration.

42. Two papers by Roald F. Campbell illustrate this concern. They are "What Peculiarities in Educational Administration Make It A Special Case," in Halpin, Administrative Theory in Education; and "The Professorship in Educational Administration—A Personal View," Educational Administration Quarterly 17 (Winter 1981).

43. See Marvin D. Dunnette, "Fads, Fashions and Folderol in Psychology," American Psychologist 21 (April 1966); R. N. Spann, "Fashions and Fantasies in Public Administration," Australian Journal of Public Administration 40 (March 1981); and Pitirim A. Sorokin, Fads and Foibles in Modern Sociology and the Related Sciences (Chicago: Henry Regnery, 1956).

44. The general topic is considered in Robert K. Merton, Social Theory and Social Structure (New York: Free Press, 1968).

45. "Ideology and Science."

46. While the U.S., closely followed by Canada, led the development of educational administration as a field of study, it is important to keep in mind that the many other countries which now have well developed programs have different national contexts. Still, we all share the problems of the "global village."

47. For the essentials see John Dewey, Logic, the Theory of Inquiry (New York: Henry Holt, 1938).

48. I mentioned feeling comfortable with a philosophic position in a talk before a group of scholars, a point that exercised one of them who thought I was equating comfort with truth. Of course, the two are very different. Nevertheless, compatibility and coherence have their values especially when one considers that many of the larger philosophical issues are not likely to be resolved.

49. John Dewey employed the term occupational psychosis in a similar way.

50. In Talcott Parsons, The Social System (Glencoe, IL: Free Press, 1951).

51. Robert K. Merton, The Sociology of Science (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1973).

52. Also see Ian I. Mitroff, The Subjective Side of Science (New York: American Elsevier, 1974).

53. On eponyony, and on the Matthew effect taken from the biblical statement on those that "hath and hath not" see Merton, The Sociology of Science. The not invented here syndrome is from Ralph Katz, "The Effects of Group Longevity on Project Communication and Performance," Administrative Science Quarterly 27 (March 1982).

54. Parsons, The Social System includes a norm that is generally similar to this one.

55. For an effort along these lines, but more in the tradition of intellectual history than sociology of knowledge, see Jack A. Culbertson, "Antecedents of the Theory Movement," Educational Administration Quarterly 17 (Winter 1981).

56. Willower, "Some Philosophical and Other Considerations."

57. "Educational Administration and Social Science: An Integrative Approach," in Social Science Content for Preparing Educational Leaders, ed. Jack Culbertson, Robin Farquhar, Bryce Forgarty and Mark Shibles (Columbus, OH: Charles E. Merrill, 1973).

58. Robin H. Farquhar, "The Social Sciences in Preparing Educational Leaders: An Interpretive Summary," in Culbertson, Farquhar, Fogarty and Shibles, Social Science Content.

59. I have used the term robustness to describe this quality in administration. See my Reason, Robustness and Educational Administration (Buffalo: State University of New York at Buffalo and Society of Educational Administrators, Holloway Lecture, 1975).

60. Alfred North Whitehead, The Aims of Education and Other Essays (New York: New American Library, 1949).

61. Norman J. Boyan, "Follow the Leader: Commentary on Research in Educational Administration," Educational Researcher 10 (February 1981).

62. Alberto Guerreiro Ramos, "Misplacement of Concepts and Administrative Theory," Public Administration Review 38 (November-December 1978), p. 550.

63. There is some evidence that knowledge about a variety of theories can lead educational administration students to a more sophisticated conception of the world. See Paula F. Silver and Robert Hess, "The Value of Theory Coursework in Enhancing Students' Conceptual Complexity," Journal of Educational Administration 19 (Winter 1981).

64. Theory is increasingly seen in educational administration in its relation to valuation. See, for example, William G. Walker, "There is Nothing More Practical Than Theory," (Paper presented at the Seventh Regional Conference on

Educational Management and Leadership, Apia, Western Samoa, August 1981); and Jack A. Culbertson, Educational Administration and The Life of the Mind (Buffalo: State University of New York at Buffalo and Society of Educational Administrators, Holloway Lecture, 1970).

65. James G. March and Johan P. Olsen, Ambiguity and Choice in Organizations (Bergen-Oslo-Tromso, Norway: Universitetsforlaget, 1976).

66. Henry Mintzberg, The Nature of Managerial Work (New York: Harper and Row, 1973). Some of the Mintzberg-type work in education is critically examined in my, "Perspectives in Juxtaposition."

67. Dewey, Human Nature and Conduct.

68. On semantic problems in organization theory see Harold Koontz, "The Management Theory Jungle Revisited," Academy of Management Review 5 (April 1980). An organizational approach to rational systems and natural systems models, terms first used by Alvin W. Gouldner, is found in W. Richard Scott, "Developments in Organization Theory, 1960-1980," American Behavioral Scientist 24 (January-February 1981).

69. Charles E. Lindblom, "Still Muddling, Not Yet Through," Public Administration Review 39 (November-December 1979).

70. William Lowe Boyd and Dennis R. Wheaton, "Policy Development in Declining Suburban School Districts," (Paper presented at a Conference on Managing Enrollment Decline, Peabody College of Vanderbilt University, Nashville, February 1982).

71. Martin Burlingame, "Superintendent Power Retention," in Bacharach, Organizational Behavior.

72. William G. Scott, Terence R. Mitchell and Newman S. Peery, "Organizational Governance," in Handbook of Organizational Design, ed. Paul C. Nystrom and William H. Starbuck (New York: Oxford University Press, 1981), Vol. 2.

73. It is noteworthy that researchers are showing more interest in the Socratic dictum by emphasizing the enhancement of objectivity through the explication of biases rather than by detachment. See, for example, Clayton P. Aldefer and Ken K. Smith, "Studying Intergroup Relations Embedded in Organizations," Administrative Science Quarterly 27 (March 1982).

ABOUT UCEA

The University Council for Educational Administration (UCEA) is a nonprofit corporation whose members are major universities in the United States and Canada. Thirty school districts are affiliated with UCEA.

History

In 1954, members of the Cooperative Program in Educational Administration (Middle Atlantic Region) proposed an organization which would be devoted to improving the professional preparation of educational administrators. To help establish such an organization, a central office with part-time staff was established on the campus of Columbia University, financed by a grant from the W. K. Kellogg Foundation to Teachers College of Columbia.

Between 1956 and 1959, with the help of the staff at the Teachers College office, UCEA's constitution and by-laws were formulated, the organization's purposes were defined, and additional financial support was obtained in the form of a five-year grant from the Kellogg Foundation. The UCEA central office was moved to its present location on the campus of The Ohio State University in 1959 and a small, full-time staff was hired.

Since its inception, the Council has worked to improve the professional preparation of administrative personnel in both continuing education and pre-service programs. UCEA has been a major contributor to:

1. Broadening the content of preparation programs for educational administrators.
2. Extending use of more effective methods of inquiry in educational administration.
3. Shifting educational administration from an anecdotal orientation to a more scientific one, leading to generalizations about organization and leadership.
4. Developing new instructional materials for administrator programs.
5. Fostering exchanges in research and in program development between professors and administrative leaders in the U.S. and their counterparts in other countries.
6. Continuing efforts toward standards of excellence in research and in preparation programs for administrative personnel in educational administration.

More recently, the Council also has focused considerable attention on strengthening relationships between institutions that prepare administrators for service and the school districts and other agencies in which administrators serve. The major means to accomplish this has been the UCEA University and School District Partnership described later in this document.

UCEA GOALS AND ACTIVITIES

UCEA engages in a variety of activities and produces a number of publications and instructional materials. All these activities and products proceed from a basic set of goals sufficiently stable to give the organization identity, yet flexible enough to respond to changing conditions in educational administration.

Goals

Briefly stated, UCEA goals are:

- To advance understanding in all areas relating to educational administration and to enhance the research capability of participating institutions.
- To develop better methods of instruction, new materials, and other approaches to help bring about more effective pre-service and staff development programs for all professionals in educational administration.
- To create more effective pathways and networks for exchanging new understandings and better methods among persons working to advance educational administration.

Program Activities

A representative sample of the many types of activities sponsored by UCEA follows:

- Inter-institutional research projects on such subjects as principalship effectiveness, education policy, and managing resources.
- Articulation of new directions for research and training — for example, in formulating research perspectives, in preparing leaders to anticipate the future, and in establishing criteria for administrator certification.
- Development and testing of training programs for administrators that make effective use of resources in other disciplines — for example, stengthening the humanities in administrator preparation programs.
- Professional renewal opportunities for member institutions — for example, seminars and workshops on subjects such as methods of research, preparing leaders for the future, and coping with the challenges of urban education.
- Involvement of graduate students from member institutions in professional seminars, institutes, and conferences and in research and development projects.
- Creation of new organizations — the UCEA University and School District Partnership and the Inter-American Society for Educational Administration.

Publications

- **Educational Administration Quarterly** (established in 1965), a journal containing conceptual and theoretical articles, research analyses, and reviews of books in educational administration.
- **Educational Administration Abstracts** (established in 1966), a journal produced through the cooperative efforts of UCEA institutions containing brief summaries of articles from approximately 140 professional journals.
- **Journal of Educational Equity and Leadership** (first published in 1980), a periodical devoted to consideration of equity-related educational needs of Hispanics, Blacks, American Indians, Asian-Americans, women, and other groups.
- **UCEA REVIEW,** an in-house periodical that provides up-to-date information on UCEA activities and news from member universities and Partnership school districts.

In addition, UCEA regularly aids in the production and distribution of a wide range of books, monographs, special reports, and other media.

Instructional Materials

UCEA is especially concerned with the need to develop instructional materials that will improve administrator preparation programs. A number of games and simulations have been developed for this purpose, including the "Monroe City" urban simulation, developed and demonstrated in various parts of the U.S. and Canada by more than 180 professors from 40 universities. The most recent UCEA training tool is the Adams Simulation, which contains five simulations of administrative positions in a surburban school district.

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